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THE RAILWAYS A~I) THE WAR
EFFORT, 1914-19151
Political and administrative background
Subsequent to the creation of the Union of
South Africa in 1910, steps were taken to
combine the armed forces of the four ex-
colonies in the new Union Defence Forces.
Appropriate legislation was provided in the
Defence Act of 1912. Considerable time was
needed before all the provisos of the Act
could be implemented, and the outbreak of
war in August 1914 found the infant Defence
Forces incomplete and unprepared for a task
of the magnitude confronting them. One spe-
cific area where arrangements were inade-
quate was that of railway transport.
Clause 89 of the Act of 1912 stipulated
that in wartime the military authorities might
requisition rolling stock and locomotives. In
addition, the Governor General could autho-
rize any officer to assume control over the
whole or any portion of any railway system
within the Union". Since this arrangement
was not compulsory, there was a choice
between two alternatives. The military es-
tablishments could assume complete control
of the railways, or control could be left in
the hands of the constituted civil administra-
tion. Between these clear alternatives various
compromise arrangements could also have
been made.
The General Manager of Railways had fixed
lIiews on the subject, being convinced that
control should rest entirely with the civil au-
thorities. He believed that those who ran
the railways in peacetime could put their
skills and knowledge to good use in wartime3•
All traffic, whether civil or military, would
be dealt with as speedily as possible, unham-
pered by interference from military comman-
ders lacking experience of railway manage-
ment. Practical reasoning apart, the General
Manager could turn to precedent. He quoted
from Lt Col Sir E. P. C. Girouard's history
of the railways during the Anglo-Boer War
of 1899-1902: 'Civil railway officials have
been heard to say that attacks by the enemy
on the line are not nearly so disturbing to
traffic as the arrival of a friendly general with
his force." During the American Civil War,
one particular incident had led to the remark
by the Assistant Secretary of War to the con-
troller of (Federal) railways: 'Be patient as
possible with the Generals. Some of them
will trouble you more than they will the ene-
my.''' Thus reasoned the civil railway adminis-
tration.
It remains unclear as to whether the Defen-
ce authorities had any particularly determined
views about military-railway relationships. In
any event, arrangements made in August
1914 and later inclined to accord with the
mainstream of the General Manager's ideas.
Formal arrangements for top-level liaison
were established on 8 August. On that date
an officer of the railway administration was
appointed Railway Transportation Officer, with
the military rank of Major, at Defence Head-
quarters. He was in direct telephonic com-
munication with all sections of the Depart-
ment of Defence, as well as with the Gene-
ral Manager of Railways. In addition, two of-
ficers of the Railway Administration were
posted to the headquarter staff of the Gene-
ral Officer Commanding in the Field, and other
railway officials were to be appointed Railway
Staff Officers, with military rank, at points
where substantial troop movements were
continually in progress.
In detail, the system functioned as follows.
The General Manager retained control of the
railways and acted in an advisory capacity to
the Minister of Defence. Railway operation
was carried-out by railway personnel under
the control of the Defence Department. At
Defence Headquarters, the Railway Transpor-
tation Officer fell under the authority of the
Quartermaster General. Requests from the
Defence authorities for rail facilities were
transmitted to him via the Quartermaster Ge-
neral. In turn he passed them on to the
'War Section' at Railway Headquarters in
Johannesburg. This War Section was set up
to direct movements of military trains, co-
1. The author would like gratefully to express his thanks
to the Librarian of the South African Railways Reference
Library in Johannesburg for the loan of much of the do-
cumentary material upon which this article is based.
2. Statutes of the Union of South Africa, 1912, p 252.
3. Report of the General Manager of Railways and Harbours
for the Year ended 31st December 1914 (UG 25 - 1915),
pp 75-76.
4. UG 25 - 1915, P 76.
5. South African Railways and Harbours Magazine, Nov 1918,
p 658.
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ordinate requests for transport, and main-
tain direct central control. Between them, the
Railway Transportation officer and the War
Section were responsible for the conveyance
by rail of troops, animals, commissariat, mu-
nitions, ordnance and other materials of war.
The Railway Staff Officers took their orders
from the War Section." A circular signed by
the Quartermaster General on 16 November
1914 explained that the Railway Transpor-
tation Officer
makes provision under the direction of
the Quartermaster-General for the move-
ment by rail of troops, animals, stores,
supplies, etc as required, also for har-
bour and dock requirements in addition
to acting generally as intermediary offi-
cer between Defence Headquarters and
Railway and Harbours Administration in
all matters ...
The R.T.O. is responsible for the satisfac-
tory marshalling of rolling stock to meet
troops' requirements and for ensuring
that entrainment and detrainment of
troops, animals, and vehicles are carried
out with care and due expedition.
He should see that all military stores
arriving are properly secured and delive-
red to consignees promptly .
The same circular laid down that
Railway Staff Officers are appointed to
Forces where such an appointment is
considered necessary and this officer will
arrange for all local movements by rail
and also where necessary, act as Mili-
tary Embarkation Officer in addition to
performing any Naval transport duties
which may be imposed upon him.7
These arrangements were made with an eye
on intended military operations to take over
German South West Africa. The system was
planned to secure co-ordination between mili-
tary and railway officers at organizational
level, thereby ensuring efficient rail services in
the field. A plan of campaign was finalized
by 21 August, and a force under Brig Gen
H. T. Lukin landed at Port Nolloth on 1 Sep-
tember, Col P. S. Beves landed at LUderitz-
bucht, without opposition, on 18 September,
and Col G. Maritz took up position at Uping-
ton with 1 000 South African Mounted Rifles.
Before it could get under way, the projected
campaign had to be suspended because of
the outbreak of rebellion in the Union.'
2
The Rebellion
Operations during the Rebellion were charac-
terized by extremely mobile, fast-moving war-
fare. The rebel commandos came into being
over a period of time and frequently operated
independently of one another. Once the few
large organized rebel bodies had been broken
up, the fighting degenerated into a series of
skirmishes and scraps between bodies of
organized loyal troops and fragmented rebel
groups.
The country where disaffection was most
rife was sparsely populated, with wide open
spaces that made it easy for rebels to melt
away and later regroup away from Govern-
ment troops. Under these difficult circum-
stances the Defence authorities had recourse
to the railways as a suitable means of moving
troops from point to point fast enough either
to surround the rebels or to block their pas-
sage in a particular direction. Troop trains
were placed at the disposal of the Defence
Department, and five armoured trains were
built.
During the Rebellion, centralized direction of
rail movements proved virtually impossible.
Rebel movements were often not predictable
and military commanders had to react to un-
expected situations without losing time.
If a commander urgently wanted rail trans-
port, he frequently overrode the railwaymen
to get his way. Many acts of interference
occured, and rail operations during the Re-
bellion were notable for ill-feeling between
defence and railway authorities, unco-opera-
tion in some instances and a good deal of
frustration to both parties.
As shown above, senior defence and railway
officials were agreed that smooth running of
the railways depended on the specialist know-
ledge of the railway staff, and following from
this it was desirable that these specialist staff
not be interfered with. In fact, local military
commanders failed to appreciate this and,
6. UG 25 - 1915, P 75; South African Railways and Harbours
Archive, File OX 158; SAR & H Archive, 'History of War
Services rendered by the Union Railway and Harbours
Administration' (Draft); Archive of the Secretary for Defence,
(DC Series), Box 113, File 2395/Z.
7. Archive of the Secretary for Defence, (DC 9199 series),
Box 78, File A.274/9199.
8. The Union of South Africa and the Great War, 1914-1918
(Official History, 1924), p 13.
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pressed both by operational contingencies and
their natural concern for the comfort and wel-
fare of their own units, would arrange train
transport for their men with scant regard for
the disruption thereby caused to other, pos-
sibly scheduled, services. Two examples will
illustrate this.
A train arrived at Krugersdorp from Pretoria
with a cargo of mules, trollies, and vater-
carts. General Myburgh, who was present, or-
dered that the train be placed in a siding.
Soon afterwards the order was counterman-
ded, and each of a number of commandos
then at the station had to be issued with all
its individual requirements. This entailed un-
loading some wagons, and transferring the
contents of some wagons to others. Once all
this was done, the transport officer discove-
red that mistakes had been made; the train
was unloaded and thereafter loaded up once
more. The railway official concerned reported
that
great rnconvenience was caused through
the officers commanding the various
squadrons being unable to give us the
slightest idea as to the number of wag-
gons, watercarts, motor cars, etc etc.
which they desired to load, and no one
seemed to care. There was no organiza-
tion of the men who took no notice of
their officers and we had the utmost
difficulty to find out who was actually
responsible for the whole business ...
At Potchefstroom a delay of seven hours was
experienced in the departure of two trains
carrying the Potchefstroom Ruiters and their
commissariat. The major cause of delay was
apparently lack of co-ordination, since troops
and equipment arrived at different times.
These two examples are representative of
what went on in the operational areas.9
Greater stress on good organization might
have alleviated or even at least partially
eliminated instances such as the above, but
there were some problems, imposed by the
type of warfare, which could not be over-
come. Because the Government troops were
entirely mounted commandos, troop trains
had to provide accommodation for men and
horses, not to mention all the accompanying
supplies and equipment. Main line coaching
stock was provided for the men, and cattle
trucks for the horses. This meant that far
more rolling stock - and therefore more
3
trains - were needed than would have been
the case for infantry only.
Horses and bulky equipment (which on a few
occasions included motor cars) could be
loaded and unloaded with relative ease only
where fixed station facilities existed. Cam-
paign exigencies often required that com-
mandos detrain and entrain at points where
facilities did not exist; this meant consider-
able time was expended with corresponding
delay to rail movement on a single track.
Then too, troops and horses could be de-
trained at one point to participate in a parti-
cular operation, might travel many miles in
so doing, and retrain somewhere far removed
from the first point. None of this could be
predicted or planned in advance. The resulting
difficulties may be imagined when it is reali-
zed that on the Klerksdorp-Kimberley line,
a single-track stretch, twenty-two troop trains
were continuously operating over a period
of several days, and in this context some sta-
tistics for rail use in the Rebellion are of
interest. The period covered is from August
to December, 1914.
Number of troops conveyed: 135000
Troop mileage : 22 200000
Number of animals con-
veyed : 169 000
Animal mileage : 27 065 000
Number of transport vehicles
conveyed : 4 855
Transport vehicle mileage : 1 090000
Supplies, ammunition, etc.
conveyed (tons) : 36 684
Supplies, ammunition, etc.
(ton miles) : 7479 000
Number of special trains: 61310
The five armoured trains proved very useful.
They were used for patrolling the line in
disaffected areas, for repairing the line where
it had been damaged by rebels, and insofar
as limited directional mobility allowed, for
combat duties such as blocking rebel at-
tempts to cross the line.
9. SAR & H Archive. File OX 58.
10. UG 25- 1915, P 77; SAR & H Archive, 'History of War
Services rendered by the Union Railway and Harbour Ad-
ministration' (Draft).
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Armoured Train No 5, 'Schrikmaker'
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Captain (From civil railway adminis-
tration; only temporarily in uniform)
4 Lieutenants (Three from civil railway
administration; one from Dept of
Defence)









25 Skilled men for
other duties
NO.2: 'Scot'
(Commissioned 6 Nov 1914)
NO.3 'Erin'
(Commissioned 9 Nov 1914)
NO.4 'Karoo'
(Commissioned 6 Nov 1914)
NO.1: 'Trafalgar'
(Commissioned 22 Oct 1914)
NO.5 'Schrikmaker'
(Commissioned 18 Nov 1914)
In addition to the armoured trains proper,
two steel bogie trucks were fitted with loop-
holes at Bloemfontein and used as an im-
provized armoured train for patrol purposes,
manned by local Defence Force members.
19 bogie trucks were fitted with sandbags
and distributed at various points in the Trans-
vaal and Orange Free State. They were either
attached to armoured trains or used as im-
provized armoured trains as circumstances
demanded.
Numbered from one to five and individually
named, the armoured trains were:
The five true armoured trains comprised
standard rolling stock, suitably reinforced
with steel plating to withstand bullets, and
provided with loopholes. The composition of
the 'Trafalgar' was:
11. UG 25 - 1915. P 79: SAR & H Archive. File DX 158.
12. Archive of the Secretary for Defence. (DC 9199 series).
Box 55. File A.188/9199. Precise establishment figures are
not available.
13. The SAEC was composed of railway staff. It was responsible
for railroad repair and construction work in GSWA.
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Armoured Train No 2, 'Erin'
Reading through the files of the Archive of the
Secretary for Defence, one perceives that
the Rebellion did not occasion any serious
interruption in planning for the campaign in
German South West Africa. Experience gained
during the Rebellion was put to good use in
the subsequent campaign and in this con-
nection one may engage in an interesting
speculation regarding a change in the system
of railway management. With effect from 15
December 1914 Mr. W. W. Hoy, General
Manager of the SA Railways and Harbours,
was appointed to temporary commissioned
rank as Colonel in the Active Citizen Force.
His post was designated 'Director of Military
Railways' and he was attached to the Per-
manent Force Staff of Defence Headquar-
ters.11 His authority and the limits of his
powers were laid down as follows:
. under and subject to the authority
of the Minister of Defence, [he] will
issue instructions to officers of the South
African Engineer Corps, as to the con-
struction and maintenance and working
of railway lines and harbour works in
those areas.
While officers of the South African En-
gineer Corps and South African Railways
and Harbours Administration ... are as
a matter of course subject to the orders
and instructions of the General or other
officer commanding ... they must carry
out any general of specific instructions
5
issued by the Director of Military Rail-
ways ...
General or other officers commanding the
Southern, Central, or Northern Forces,
should refrain from giving any instruc-
tions in conflict with the Director's ge-
neral or specific instructions, but should
represent to the Minister any points in
which they are of opinion that the mili-
tary situation requires any modification
of the Director's general or specific in-
structions.lo
It is not possible to prove a direct connec-
tion between Col Hoy's appointment and
the experiences of the Rebellion, but quali-
fied speculation in that direction is in order.
For it is indisputable that Col Hoy believed
very strongly in the doctrine of non-inter-
ference in railway affairs, and he let no oppor-
tunity slip past of stating his case. He would
have welcomed any arrangement to reduce
military interference.'" On their side, the De-
fence authorities did not wish to offend
highly-placed (and sensitive) persons like
Hoy; then too, it was clear that the Railway
Staff Officers needed additional backing.
This is not to suggest that Col Hoy was
14. Geceral Orders (No 10 of 1914), dd 15 Dec 1914, Para9raph
133.
15 Ibid.
10 For statements of Hoy's approach see UG 25 - 1915, pp 75
ct seq: SAR & H ArC:lIve, 'Relationship with Defence Dept
and organisation to be arranged in time of War'; Archive
of the Secretary for Defence, (DC series). Box 113. File
2395/Z.
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given an open hand. The terms of his ap-
pointment show the Minister of Defence as
the supreme authority. However, the Minis-
ter's directions were not to be conveyed to
Col Hoy by military commanders in the field;
the last paragraph of the order reaffirms that
liason between defence and railway authori-
ties would be conducted at top level - that
is, between DHQ and the War Section in
Johannesburg.
The Campaign in German South West Africa
The Railways' involvement in GSWA extended
far beyond the provision of transport. Con-
::;iderations of strategy required that several
new railroads be built where none existed
previously.
Shipping had to be chartered or otherwise
supplied to convey troops and war material
from Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town
to Walvis Bay, Port Nolloth and Swakop-
mund. A great quantity of miscellaneous
equipment was provided from Railway stocks,
and some equipment was manufactured for
the Defence Department, leading the General
Manager to remark that the railway work-
shops 'have, to a certain extent, served as
the Woolwich Arsenal of the Defence Force.";
Mounting guns at the Salt River works
South African forces approaching from the
south would depend on the railways for sup-
plies. But in 1914 a direct rail link with Ger-
man territory did not exist. The northernmost
South African railhead was at Prieska, and
the southernmost German one, at Kalkfon-
tein. The intervening distance was 315 miles.
On 15 August 1914 the Defence Department
requested the Railways to construct a line to
Upington as speedily as possible. Work be-
gan on 24 August and Upington (South)
was reached on 20 November.li' New mate-
6
rial for a line of such length was not avail-
able and the entire Union was combed for
items. Afterwards the railway authorities
professed themselves greatly satisfied with
progress; in one semi-official publication the
line was called 'one of the noteworthy feats
in the annals of railway construction."" Con-
struction continued day and night.
17. UG 25 - 1915, P 81.
18. SAR & H Archive, 'History of War Services rendered by
the Union Railway and Harbours Administration' (Draft).
19. South African Railways and Harbours Magazine, Aug 1915,
p 704.
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The mobile plant which enabled work on the Prieska-Upington line to proceed at night
The Prieska-Upington line was not yet com-
plete when the Government decided to con-
tinue it to Nakob, on the German border,
and thence to Kalkfontein. From there the
German-built lines could be used as many
of them were built to the standard 3 foot
6 inch gauge of the Union lines. Work com-
menced on a temporary bridge across the
Orange River at Upington but was interrup-
ted by floods. To deal with this a ferry service
was instituted to convey supplies over the ri-
ver for military forces operating to the north.
Several small vessels were provided for the
ferry service, and a large ferry pontoon with
cradles. slipways and docks was designed
and built at the railway workshops in Cape
Town. With this locomotives and other heavy
equipment were floated across the river so
that construction of the Upington-Kalkfontein
line could proceed. The line reached Nakob
[.~":'~...
Construction of the Pi"ieska-Upington line
7
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on 17 May 1915 and linked with the Ger-
man system at Kalkfontein on 25 June.""
The Prieska-Upington-Kalkfontein line was by
far the most involved and extensive construc-
fon operation undertaken, but there were
also three other new construction tasks. In
addition to these great stretches of line had to
be rebuilt in the wake of the German retreat.
The Germans seriously damaged the lines and
either took rolling stock with them or de-
stroyed it. Railway ancillary services were
left unusable. Construction and reconstruc-



























20. SAR & H Archive, 'History of War Services rendered by
the Union Railway and Harbours Administration' (Draft).
21. Soul:, African Railways and Harbours Magazine, Nov 1918,
P 663.
German wrecking party, Tsanichas River bridge
Railway Staff Officers were appointed in
terms of the scheme explained previously.
When Brig Gen Lukin's force landed at Port
Nolloth on 1 September 1914 it was accom-
panied by Mr R. R. Perrott, a Divisional Su-
perintendent, in the capacity of Director of
Railways. He was responsible for running
the Cape Copper Company's railway and har-
bour in Namaqualand in terms of Clause 89
of the Defence Act. This involved supervision
of the disembarkation of approximately 3 000
men, 4. 000 animals, and 6 000 tons of sup-
plies, munitions and equipment. At the end
of October 1914 Perrott returned to the Union
due to the suspension of the campaign. On
29 November he was selected for the similar
post of Assistant Director of Military Railways
at Luderitzbucht. Col Hoy, in terms of the
powers vested in him, empowered Perrott
to take local control of the working of rail-
8
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ways at and near LUderitzbucht. He was res-
ponsible for the passing of requisitions for all
material and stores for railway and harbour
purposes, and the water supply, armoured
trains, and their crews also fell under his
jurisdiction."" The Quartermaster General in-
structed the DAQMG at LUderitzbucht on 4
December that Perrott would hold the
rank of Major and
will be an Administrative Officer on
your Staff and will refer to you on mat-
ters of principle. In routine matters he
will conduct the business of his De-
partment ... The Director of Railways
and Harbours will, however, make direct
arrangements for and obtain any rail-
way material or harbour plant that may
be necessary ... This procedure will
prevent any unnecessary circumlocution,
as Major Perrott is the only officer able
to gauge requirements.""
The function of the armoured trains in GSWA
is not very clear. It seems that four were
sent here ('Trafalgar', 'Karoo', 'Scot', and
'Schrikmaker') and that the 'Erin' was retained
in the Union in case of an emergency."' Their
application in GSWA would in all likelihood
have been to escort advanced troops and
patrol the line.";;
In addition to the armoured trains, several
gun trains were sent to GSWA. These were
essentially a means of transporting heavy
guns - 12 pounders, 2.5" howitzers, and
4.7" naval guns loaned by the Imperial naval
authorities at Simonstown. It was neither
practicable nor in some instances possible to
fire the guns from the train. There appear
to have been seven such trains. 'B' Battery
(No.4-gun train) was composed as follows:
One extended tender frame for 4.7" gun
Two armoured trucks
One armoured van
One armoured water tank truck
One armoured stores truck
Ons armoured caboose
One armoured flat bogie.""
22. GAR & H Archive, 'History of War Services rendered by the
Union Railway and Harbours Administration' (Draft); SAR
& H Archive, File DX 153.
23. Arc:lIve of the Secretary for Defence (DC 9199 series),
Box 73, File A.274/9IS9.
24. SAR & H Archive, Files DX 10, DX 158.
25. Archive of the Secretary for Defence (DC 9199 series),
Box 55, File A.188/9199
23. Ibid; SAR & H Archive, File DX 10.
Six-inch gun mounted in running position
10
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To transport troops and supplies the Rail-
ways and Harbours Department chartered
15 steamers. These, along with the ex-
German Rufidji, taken as a prize, represented
a tonnage of 57,479. Eleven tugs were provi-
ded for harbour work; five of these were the
property of the SAR & H. Several launches
and lighters were obtained to help with disem-
barkation.
Active prosecution of a campaign in a dry arid
area of operations depended on an assured
supply of water. Under the German regime
a condensing plant was installed at LGderitz-
bucht, but it was deliberately damaged when
the Germans retreated. There was also a
plant at Walvis Bay, but both plants together
were unable to meet the demands of an ar-
my. Responsibility for the water supply was
relegated to the SA Engineer Corps, and by
enlarging the plants at LGderitzbucht and Wal-
vis Bay, and erecting equipment at Swakop-
mund, an extra 168,000 gallons per day were
supplied.
Ambulance vehicles were provided. Two bo-
gie vans were converted into fully equipped
ambulance coaches, each accommodating 16
patients, and ran between Cape Town and
Wynberg. A third similar coach operated on
the Upington line. Two travelling post office
vans were converted into ambulance vans in
the Railways' Pretoria workshops.
Ambulance van
Searchlights, bought from local mining com-
panies, were fitted to the armoured trains
and two motor buses."'
Statistics for rail transport for the entire cam-
paign are not available, but from the following,
11
covering the period August-December 1914,
it will be seen that the task was one of real
magnitude.
27. UG 25 - 1915, SAR & H Archive, File DX 158.
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Number of troops conveyed:
Troop mileage
Number of animals conveyed:
Animal mileage












(ton miles) 11 832 000
Number of special trains 247"S
How may one assess the effectiveness and
value of the Railways' contribution to the war
effort over the period of the Rebellion and
the campaign in German South West? In all
A frequeni sight: demolished bridge, GSWA
the Railway documentation studied by the
present writer, not one single item was found
where;n any railway official analysed or cri-
tically examined the work of the railway ad-
ministrat:on. The tone is of pride and occa-
s:onal self-satisfaction in a good job well
done. From the Defence documentation it is
clear that the Defence authorities did their
utmost to co-operate with the Railways. Due
to pressure of other factors, and the need to
reElct to unexpected situations, it was how-
ever not always possible to meet railway
schedules or to warn railway authorities in
advance. In official Defence correspondence
. there is no substantial indication of displea-
sure with the Railways, and so the following,
written by General Botha to General Smuts





... Hoy with all his engineers has caus-
ed chaos . . . I hElve already made all
sorts of plans, but it is now becoming
c1eai to me that our forward movement
is being delayed by the clumsy feeble-
ness 0•. a bunch of engineers, and be-
cause of these Collins"" and Beaton::"
should never be in such a respons:ble
posit:on, and I fear that Hoy listens to
them to much. However, it is damned
discouraging and has a bad effect on the
burghers and gives the enemy every
chElnce to make the already difficult po-
sitions before us still more difficult::' ...
2J UG 25 - 1915. P 76.
29. Officer Commandmg the SA Engineer Corps. with the rank
0; Lt Col.
30. Second-in-command to Collins. with the rank of Major.
31. W. K. Har.cock and J. van dcr Poel (eds): Selections from
the Smuts Papers, Vol III. pp 635, 636. (CUP. 1966).
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Motor rail-lorry equipped for ambulance purposes
Apparently the Commander-in-Chief would
have welcomed greater authority over the tem-
porarily uniformed railway staff, but his po-
wers were circumscribed by the terms of
reference granted to Col Hoy in December
1914. Botha was probably referring to a delay
caused by local problems; in other words,
a situation which could not be resolved
through the established arrangement of
War Section, Railway Transport Officer, and
Railway Staff Officers. But if Botha felt that
the railway administration had too much of a
free hand, he would have encountered op-
position from those men. After the GSWA
campaign Hoy drafted, but did not submit, a
series of proposals for co-operation with the
Defence Department in time of war.3~ In them
he argued strongly for an independent rail-
way organization. And in 1917 Hoy sent a
memorandum to the defence authorities with
these remarks:
[The Department of Defence's] methods
have been most exasperating at times
during the past three years and have re-
sulted in much avoidable inconvenience
and expence .
Now that the more urgent military de-
13
mands have been met, I deem it my
duty to refer to some of the many avoid-
able difficulties ... in the hope that a
knowledge thereof will yet result in a
better understanding and in an endea-
vour, on the part of the Defence De-
partment, to avoid the mistakes of the
past ... 33
The Secretary for Defence personally des-
cribed the memorandum as a 'diatribe'; he
regarded parts of it as 'nonsense'; and no-
ted, 'I cannot for a moment understand what
on earth Sir William Hoy means by his fre-
quent references to "interference." The Sec-
retary sent his comments on the memorandum
to the Minister of Defence, and his reaction
is shown in the endorsement: 'Seen by Mi-
nister. No action: file.'3.j The Defence authori-
ties were not prepared to concede any fur-
ther degree of control.
The value of the Railways' contribution was
immense. It was true indeed that the
32. SAR & H Archive, 'Relationship with Defence Dept and
organisation to be arranged in time of War.'
33. Arc~ive of the Secretary for Defence, (DC series), Box 113,
File 2335/Z.
34. Ibid.
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SAR & H rendered unique services without
which the suppression of the Rebellion and
the advance into GSWA would have been
enormously complicated. But it is also true
to say that the efficiency of each party was
called in question by the other and that the
14
elaborate liaison structure was unable to han-
dle all contingencies. In retrospect it is pos-
sible to see in the melting-pot of 1914-1915
the first stages in the evolution of the Rail-
ways and Harbours Brigade as an Active
Citizen Force unit after the war.
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